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Federal Crop Insurance vs.
ASCS  Disaster Assistance  for
Texas  High  Plains Cotton  Producers:
An  Application  of Whole-Farm  Simulation
Catharine M.  Lemieux,
James W.  Richardson and Clair J.  Nixon
A  typical  Texas  High  Plains  cotton  farm  was  simulated  over  a  10-year  planning
horizon using the FLIPSIM  IV  model to  compare  the effects  of (a) participation  in the
Federal Crop Insurance  (FCI) program,  (b) participation  in the  ASCS low yield disaster
program  with either high or low target prices,  or (c) nonparticipation.  It was found that
the highest  level of crop insurance provided  similar benefits  as the disaster  program.
The importance of the Federal Crop Insur-
ance  (FCI)  program  has  been  spotlighted
since  it  became  the  primary  disaster  assist-
ance  program  offered  by  the  government,
replacing  the  Agricultural  Stabilization  and
Conservation  Service (ASCS) low yield disas-
ter  assistance  program  and  augmenting  the
Farmers  Home  Administration  emergency
loan  program.  Changes  were  made  to  the
FCI  program  to  make  the  coverage  more
attractive  to  producers,  following passage  of
the  Federal  Crop  Insurance  Act  of  1980.
These  changes  included,  30  percent subsidy
of premiums for coverage up to 65 percent of
the  guaranteed  yield,  price  elections  based
on  market  prices,  and  coverage  offered  in
every county for every crop.1 While previous
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'The  subsidy  for  the  75  percent  of guaranteed  yield
equals the absolute  dollar amount of the subsidy for the
65 percent  of the guaranteed  yield.
participation  in the  program  had been fairly
constant at approximately 14 percent of eligi-
ble  acres,  former  Director  of the  Federal
Crop  Insurance  Corporation  (FCIC),  James
Deal,  estimated that 68 percent participation
would  be  necessary  to  make  the  expanded
FCI program  cost effective.
In  this  analysis  of  the  FCI  program,  the
long-run  benefits  of participation  in the new
crop  insurance  program  were  investigated
from  the  farmer's  perspective.  Because  of
discounts  given  by  FCIC  for  favorable  loss
experience  and  automatic  enrollment, 2 the
decision  to purchase  Federal Crop Insurance
is  usually  a long-run,  rather  than  an  annual
decision.  Participation  in the ASCS program
was  also  a long-run  decision  because  of the
necessity  of establishing an  allotment for the
farm  to be  eligible  for  the  assistance.  Most
previous studies  have only evaluated Federal
Crop  Insurance  and  the  low  yield  disaster
program  on  an  annual  basis.  In  this  study,
both  programs  are  analyzed  over  a  10-year
period  with  respect to the  effect  of continu-
ous  participation  on  a  farm  owner's  net
worth,  after-tax  net present  value,  farm size,
2A farmer  is continuously enrolled in the program unless
he notifies FCIC to the contrary prior to December 31.
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and  leverage.  This study  also  addresses  the
structural  impacts  of  switching  from  the
ASCS  low  yield  disaster  assistance  program
to the expanded  FCI program.
The  ASCS  disaster  program  provided  a
disaster payment for cotton farmers  who suf-
fered yields below 75 percent of their normal
allotment.  The  amount  of any payment  was
equal  to  one  third  of the  target  price  times
the  difference  between  75  percent  of the
normal allotment and the actual yield.  To be
eligible  for  assistance,  a farmer  had to  have
an  established  cotton  allotment  and  have
been certified as eligible by the ASCS county
committee.  There  was  also an  upper limita-
tion  on  disaster  payments  by  ASCS  of
$100,000.  The  major  difference  between
ASCS  disaster coverage  and FCI coverage  is
that  the  ASCS  program  was  free  while  the
FCI program provided  greater  coverage  but
at a cost.  Also only six crops were eligible for
ASCS disaster assistance while the  FCI pro-
gram  now covers  28 crops.
The benefits  of crop  insurance  depend  on
the amount of indemnities  paid on insurance
purchased.  In the FCI program,  indemnities
are  paid  on  insured  crops  when  the  actual
production on  the entire farm  falls below the
percentage  of the guaranteed yield selection.
The amount of the indemenity is the shortfall
in  production  times  the  price  selected.
Farmers  may  elect  to  insure  50,  65,  or  90
percent  of  the  guaranteed  yield  and  also
select a price,  approximately  equal to 60,  70,
or  90  percent  of  a  projected  market  price.
The combination of these two values with the
shortfall  in production  is used  in  calculating
indemnities.  For  cotton,  the  guaranteed
yield depends  on the maturity  of the crop at
the  time  of the  disaster.  If planting  is  pre-
vented  only  production  equal  to  the  first
stage  guarantee  is  used in the  calculation  of
indemnities.  If the  crop  is  planted  but  the
average  yield per planted acre is less than 20
percent  of the  yield  guarantee,  the  stage  2
guarantee  is  used  to  calculate  indemnities.
Only  if 20 percent of the guaranteed  yield is
actually harvested  is  the third  stage  guaran-
teed  yield used.  The difference  in the  stage
guarantees  is  supposed  to  approximate  the
farmer's  investment in the crop  as the season
progresses.
Portions  of the  county  with  similar  yield
histories  are  grouped  into  common  risk
areas,  each  having  their  own  guaranteed
yield.  Guaranteed  yields  are  calculated  for
each risk area by determining the fraction the
10-year county  average  deviates  from  the  5-
year production average  for each  group. This
fraction  times  the  10-year  county  average
equals  the  guaranteed  yield  for  each  risk
area.  A  farmer  may  insure  50,  65,  or  75
percent  of that guaranteed  yield.
FCI premiums depend  on the price  elect-
ed,  the  level of protection  selected,  the  risk
area for the particular farmer,  and the ratio of
the sum of premiums to the sum of indemni-
ties  (loss  ratio)  for  past  years.  A  constant
relationship  between  these  factors  is  main-
tained, which implies that if any of the factors
increase  (decrease)  the  premium  will  in-
crease (decrease),  proportionately.
Review  of Previous  Studies
Following  the  proposal  of the  Farm  Pro-
duction Protection Act in  1978, Federal Crop
Insurance  has  been  of much  interest  to  re-
searchers.  The Act would have elminated the
Agricultural  Stabilization  and  Conservation
Service  (ASCS)  Disaster  Payment  Program
and the  Farmers  Home  Administration  and
Small  Business  Administration  Emergency
Loan  Programs,  and  expanded  the  Federal
Crop  Insurance  Program.  The  Act  did  not
pass,  but funding for the ASCS  disaster pro-
gram was  eliminated,  starting with  the  1982
crop year, and the FCI program was expand-
ed. In addition to changes in rates and cover-
age previously  mentioned,  the  1980 Federal
Crop Insurance Act authorized the offering of
crop insurance  in  250  additional counties  on
28 crops.  By 1985 it is projected that Federal
Crop  Insurance  will  be  available  in  every
county  in  the  United  States  for  over  400
agricultural  commodities.  These  changes
have led to a renewed interest in the effect of
purchasing  crop  insurance  on  the  financial
condition  of farmers.  Miller  and  Trock,  in
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their review  of disaster  assistance  programs
available to farmers,  listed some of the issues
to  be considered  in  evaluating  farm  disaster
assistance.  They indicated  there was  a possi-
bility crop insurance might enable farmers to
expand  their  operations  at  a  faster  rate  if
financial risks  were reduced.
Recent  simulation  studies  by  King  and
Oamek and Griffin and Ahrenholz  evaluated
the desirability  of purchasing  crop insurance
on  an  annual  basis.  These  studies were  un-
able  to  evaluate  the financial  effects  of pur-
chasing crop insurance over a period of time.
King  and  Oamek  stated  that  more  work
needed to be done on the examination  of the
sensitivity of  risk  management  strategies  to
changes  in  farm  size  and  risk  preferences.
Both works found crop insurance to be bene-
ficial  under most conditions;  however,  Grif-
fin and Ahrenholz cautioned that their results
were  dependent  on  the  yield  assumptions
used.  They  pointed out that  as the  variation
of  possible  yields  was  reduced,  the  effec-
tiveness  of crop  insurance  as a  risk manage-
ment tool was  reduced.
Methodology
A  computer  model  was  used  to  simulate
the effects  of a farmer's participation  in  vari-
ous  levels  of  FCI  coverage,  the  low  yield
disaster  program,  and  nonparticipation  in
disaster  assistance,  over  a  10-year  planning
horizon.  A typical cotton  farm  on  the South-
ern  High  Plains  of Texas  was  used  for  the
analysis.  The  simulation  results  were  com-
pared,  using stochastic  dominance to predict
the  probable  participation  or  non-
participation  in the  alternative  programs  by
producers  with various  risk preferences.
Stochastic  dominance  with  respect  to  a
function,  rather than mean-variance  analysis,
was  used  to  predict  producer  preferences
among the various insurance options and dis-
aster  programs.  This  methodology  was
selected  because  the  authors  expected  the
probability  distributions  for  after-tax  net
present  value  to  be  positively  skewed.  This
result  was  expected  since  these  programs
truncate  the bottom  of the yield  distribution
and  thus  skew  the  probability  distributions
for  such  output  variables  as  net  present
value.  Stochastic  dominance  procedures  can
more  effectively  handle problems  associated
with  skewed  distributions  than  mean-
variance analysis.
To  make  the  comparisons  of  probability
distributions  required  by  stochastic  domi-
nance,  the  simulation  model  was  used  to
generate  probability  distributions  for  the
criteria being analyzed.  The criterion  select-
ed was after-tax net present value. This  mea-
sure of producer's well-being was used since
it incorporated  both annual  after-tax  returns
and  changes  in  net worth  for  the farm  over
the planning  horizon.
With  stochastic  dominance  procedures,  it
is  possible  to  rank  probability  distributions
for different  levels of risk.  Meyer developed
an approach  based on the work of Arrow and
Pratt which  generalizes  the stochastic  domi-
nance  theorems.  The  algorithm  allows  esti-
mates of risk aversion to be used,  rather than
eliciting  risk aversion  coefficients  from  indi-
vidual  farmers.  The  stochastic  dominance
comparisons  enable  the  preferences  for
classes  of decision  makers within  a  group to
be  determined  without  knowing  the  quan-
titative  measure  of  risk  aversion  for  each
individual  producer.  Kramer  and Pope  used
Meyer's  program  to  rank  producer's  prefer-
ences  for  various  farm  programs  while  King
and Oamek,  and Kramer used the procedure
to evaluate crop insurance alternatives.  Table
1 lists  the  boundaries  for  the  risk  aversion
coefficients  used  in  this  study.  The  four
boundaries  are  representative  of  the  four
classes  of  decision  makers  and  range  from
those who have a preference  for risk to those
who  are risk averse.
Description of the Model
The Farm Level  Income and Policy Simu-
lation  Model  (FLIPSIM  IV),  developed  by
Richardson  and Nixon,  was used to generate
the  probability  distributions  necessary  for
the stochastic  dominance  analysis.  Since  the
typical  farm  being  analyzed  has  grown  only
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TABLE 1.  Risk-Aversion Coefficients.
Producer Groups  Lower  Bound  Upper  Bound
Risk Loving  -. 00001  .00
Risk Neutral  -. 00001  .00001
Moderately  Risk Averse  .00  .00001
Risk Averse  -. 00001  .000015
cotton  for the past  six  years,  the farm's  crop
mix is fixed throughout the planning horizon.
Stochastic  prices  and yields  were  randomly
selected from a multivariate normal distribu-
tion  for  each  year  of the  10-year  planning
horizon.  The  10-year  period  was  simulated
recursively  for  50  iterations  to  generate  a
sample  probability  distribution  for  after-tax
net present  value.
The  multivariate  normal  distribution  for
dryland  and  irrigated  cotton  yields  was  de-
veloped from  actual yields on a typical  High
Plains  farm  located  in  Lynn County,  Texas.
Annual yields per harvested  acre from  1971-
1980 were  used to develop  the distribution.
Actual yields  were  used  since  a  distribution
developed  from  county  average  yield  data
has  considerably  less  variability  than  the
yield distribution  an individual  farmer  faces.
The Shapiro-Wilk's  W test of the annual yield
data failed  to reject the  null hypothesis  that
cotton  yields are  distributed  normally.
The model  simulates the standard financial
activities of a farm. This includes paying fixed
and  variable  costs,  borrowing  and  repaying
loans,  withdrawing  family  living  expenses,
depreciating  (or cost recovering)  machinery,
and pyaing income taxes.  The model is recur-
sive in that the financial position at the end of
the  year  is  the  beginning  position  for  the
following year.  Costs  of production  and crop
prices  are  inflated  at  7  percent  per  year.
Machinery  purchased  prior  to  1980  was  de-
preciated  using the double declining balance
method and assumed a depreciation  period of
seven  years.  Machinery  placed  in  use  after
1980 is recovered assuming a five-year recov-
ery period.  Tax schedules  contained  in  the
1981  Economic Tax Recover  Act were incor-
porated  in  the  model  for  the  calculation  of
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income  taxes.  Income tax rates were indexed
after  1985  based  on  percentage  changes  in
the Consumer Price Index  (CPI) of 7 percent
per  year.  The  producer  was  permitted  to
follow  a  scheme  of tax  minimization  by  ad-
justing crop  sales between  tax years.  This  is
accomplished in the model by calculating the
proportion  of the  crops  to be  sold,  prior  to
December  31,  which  results  in  a  taxable
income of $7,400.  The model takes into con-
sideration  sales  of crops  from  the  previous
year  sold  in  the  current  tax  year,  fixed  and
variable  production  expenses,  depreciation,
interest  expenses,  personal  income  tax  de-
ductions,  off-farm  income,  government  pay-
ments,  etc.
The  model  simulates  the  following  farm
programs:  price  support,  income  support,
farmer  owned  reserve,  low  yield  disaster,
acreage  diversion,  and  Federal  Crop  Insur-
ance.  Federal  Crop  Insurance  indemnities
are calculated assuming all disasters causing a
loss in cotton yield occur after plantings.3 Per
acre  premiums  for  crop  insurance  are  in-
creased or decreased based on the operator's
loss record and the adjustment schedule  pro-
vided  by FCIC  (Table  2).  To  avoid  oversta-
ting  the  insurance  benefits,  the  stage  two
yield  guarantees  for  cotton  are  used  when
appropriate,  rather  than  using  stage  three
yield  guarantees  in  all cases.
3Since  individual  yield  records  made  available  to  the
authors  failed  to  indicate  the  stage  of the  crop  when
particular  disasters  occurred,  it was  assumed  all  disas-
ters  resulting  in  a  low  yield  would  occur  after  first
bloom.  This  is  the  cut-off point between  the first  and
second  stage  guarantee.  Second  stage  indemnities  are
approximately  150%  of indemnities  available if the  dis-
aster occurs  prior to first bloom.
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The farm  was  permitted  to  grow  by  pur-
chasing  and/or  leasing  additional  cropland
and by purchasing additional machinery.  The
price of new and used machinery was inflated
7 percent  and 1 percent per year, respective-
ly.  The  market  value  of farmland  was  cal-
culated annually be inflating the initial value
of cropland  at  7  percent  per  year.  Ending-
year cash flow deficits were  met by a second
mortgage  on  long-or  intermediate-term  as-
sets  or  by  selling  a  poriton  of  the  owned
farmland.  The  choice  was  regulated  by  the
existing  security  available  and  the  debt  to
asset ratio for the farm.  If adequate  cash was
available  at the end of the year,  the producer
purchased  or leased  farmland  in multiples  of
160 acres. The decision to grow required a 40
percent downpayment  for cropland and  a 25
percent  downpayment  for  any  additional
machinery  required.  Up to 50 percent of the
required downpayment for land could be met
by equity in  existing cropland.  At the end of
its  useful  life,  each  item  of  machinery  was
either  traded  in  and replaced,  kept  and not
replaced,  or  scraped  and  replaced,  depend-
ing on the piece of machinery  and its expect-
ed trade-in  value.  Additional  machinery  was
purchased  in  descrete  units  when  growth
rendered  the  present  complement  inade-
quate.
Typical Farm
The typical farm selected for the analysis  is
a 1,088  acre  Texas  High  Plains  cotton  farm.
This  size farm  is the  modal  size  commerical
farm  in  the region.  Approximately  one-third
of the  farm's  cropland  is  irrigated  and  the
operator  leases  about  60 percent of all crop-
land  on a crop  share basis.  The crop choices
are  dryland  and  irrigated  cotton.  Data  to
describe .the typical farm were obtained from
a stratified  random  sample  of producers  on
the  Texas  High  Plains  [Smith,  Richardson,
and Knutson].  Information from  the produc-
er survey was  supplemented  with survey in-
formation  from  financial  institutions,  input
suppliers  and  cotton  brokers  in  the  region.
Per acre costs  of production for the base year
were  calculated  from  the  survey  data  and
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inflated at 7 percent per year throughout the
planning  horizon.  Costs  of production  were
reduced  12 percent once  the farm  grew past
the 1,750 acre level to account for economies
of size on larger scale  farms  in the area.  The
average crop yields for the farm were 410 lbs.
per  harvested  acre  for  irrigated  cotton  and
182  Ibs.  per  acre  for  dryland  cotton.  Mean
crop yields were assumed to be constant over
the  10-year  planning  horizon  since  yields
have exhibited  little or no trend over the past
5 years.
The  farm  family  had four  income  tax  de-
ductions and off-farm income from all sources
equalled $16,000 per year.  The farm's begin-
ning debt asset ratio  was  45 percent.  It was
assumed the operator had not previously par-
ticipated  in the FCI program.
Disaster  Assistance Options Analyzed
Three disaster protection options analyzed
for the typical  farm  are;  (a) no insurance,  (b)
ASCS  low  yield  disaster  assistance,  and  (c)
Federal Crop Insurance.  For the FCI option,
nine  combinations  of price  and yield  cover-
age were simulated.  The various disaster pro-
tection  options are  listed in  Table 3.
Nineteen  eighty-one prices  and premiums
for FCI coverage were used as the base year.
FCI premiums included  a 30 percent govern-
ment subsidy and assumed the producer pur-
chased FCI hail and fire protection.  Elected
prices  and premiums  were  inflated  annually
by 7 percent.
Since targeted  prices  were  used  to  calcu-
late  ASCS  low  yield  disaster payments,  this
program  was  simulated  using  two  different
sets  of target  prices.  For both  sets,  cotton
target  prices  in  1982-1985  are  assumed  to
equal  the  minimum  values  specified  in  the
Agriculture  and Food  Act of 1981.  The  first
set (scenario  B1) assumes cotton target prices
after  1985  will increase  five  cents  per pound
(or about  7  percent)  each  year.  The  second
set (scenario B2) assumes cotton target prices
after  1985  will  increase  4  percent  per  year,
the  average  increase  in  cotton  target  prices
under the  1977  farm  program.  (The first  set
of target prices  were used for  all nine of the
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TABLE 3.  Disaster Protection  Options Analyzed.
Non-participation in FCI  or ASCS  low  yield disaster assistance.
ASCS  low yield disaster program  assuming  high target  prices after  1985.
ASCS  low yield disaster program  assuming  low target prices  after 1985.
Federal  Crop  Insurance - 50% of  guaranteed  yield and  low price option.
Federal  Crop  Insurance - 50% of guaranteed  yield and  medium  price option.
Federal  Crop  Insurance - 50% of  guaranteed  yield and  high  price option.
Federal  Crop  Insurance - 65% of  guaranteed  yield and low  price option.
Federal  Crop  Insurance - 65% of  guaranteed  yield and  medium  price option.
Federal  Crop  Insurance - 65% of  guaranteed  yield and  high  price option.
Federal  Crop  Insurance - 75% of  guaranteed  yield and  low  price option.
Federal  Crop  Insurance - 75% of  guaranteed  yield and  medium  price option.
Federal  Crop  Insurance - 75% of  guaranteed  yield and  high  price option.
FCI  scenarios.)  The  typical  farm's  program
yield  (used  to  calculate  disaster  payments)
was  set  equal  to  the  farm's  average  annual
yield.
Results
The program options described  in Table 3
were simulated for a typical High  Plains cot-
ton  farm  over  the  1981-1990  time  period.
The  means  and  standard  deviations  for
selected  output  variables  are  reported  in
Table  4.  On  the  average,  purchasing  the
highest level of crop insurance coverage  over
a  10-year period increased  after-tax  net pre-
sent  value  28  percent,  ending net  worth  18
percent,  size  of  farm  8  percent,  and  de-
creased  the leverage  ratio 23  percent,  when
compared  to  the  no  disaster  protection  op-
tion.  The  high  target  price  ASCS  disaster
program,  on the average,  increased  after-tax
net  present  value  26  percent,  ending  net
worth  18 percent,  size of farm 6 percent,  and
decreased  the  ending  leverage  ratio  26 per-
cent,  when  compared  to  the  no  protection
option.  Similar results were obtained  for the
low target price disaster program.  When the
highest level of crop insurance  is compaed to
the  disaster  program,  with  either  level  of
target prices,  there appears to  be only slight
differences  in  the four output variables  pre-
sented in  Table 4.  As  expected,  lower levels
of FCI coverage  result  in  significantly  lower
values for average after-tax net present value.
The  average  ending  loss  ratios  (ratio  of
total indemnities  to total  premiums  over  10
years)  for the nine  FCI options  are  constant
across  price  elections  for  each  guaranteed
yield level.  This indicates  that the premiums
within a given yield guarantee provide equal
coverage  per  dollar  of premium.  However,
the coverage per premium  dollar is not equal
across  yield  guarantee  levels.  A  1:1  ratio  of
losses  to premiums  would  indicate  an  insur-
ance  policy  is unbiased.  A ratio  higher (low-
er)  than  one  indicates  that  indemnities  ex-
ceed  (are  less  than)  premiums.  Since  the
government  is  providing  a  30 percent  sub-
sidy for the low and medium yield coverage,
the  expected  loss  ratio  over  time  for  these
levels of coverage should be about 1.42.  The
average loss  ratios for the low (1.64),  medium
(1.61),  and  high  (1.41)  yield  coverage  levels
in  this  example  indicate  approximately  a  40
percent subsidy for the two lower yield levels
and about  a 30  percent subsidy  for the  high
yield coverage  level.  Finally,  since  the aver-
age  loss  ratio  for  all  nine  levels  of coverage
exceeds  1.1  (see Table  2),  cotton farmers  in
the  High  Plains  should  expect  their  pre-
miums  to  be adjusted upward over time.
Table  5 presents  a ranking of disaster pro-
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TABLE  4.  Financial  Characteristics  of a Typical  High  Plains Cotton  Farm  Simulated  for 10
Years  Under Alternative  Yield  Protection Programs.
FCI  Price  Election  Levels  N No Federal
Type  of Coverage  Low Price  Medium  Price  High  Price  Crop  Insurance
------------------------- After-Tax  Net Present Value  ($1,000) ------------------------
Federal  Crop  Insurance
Low yield  (50%)
mean  567.6  574.2  580.1
std.  dev.  569.4  572.8  619.9
Medium yield  (65%)
mean  583.0  591.9  612.3
std. dev.  612.4  614.5  628.5
High  yield (75%)
mean  594.9  611.5  674.8
std. dev.  607.8  615.2  787.5
Low  Yield  Disaster  Prog.
High  target prices
mean  665.2
std. dev.  738.3
Low target prices
mean  657.4
std. dev.  737.6
No Crop  Insurance  and
No Disaster  Program
mean  525.8
std.  dev.  598.9
----------------------Cropland  Farmed  in Last  Year (acres) --------------------------
Federal  Crop  Insurance
Low yield (50%)
mean  1,362.3  1,359.1  1,356.1
std. dev.  402.7  390.9  415.6
Medium  yield (65%)
mean  1,366.4  1,376.0  1,376.0
std. dev.  414.9  398.5  386.5
High  yield (75%)
mean  1,363.2  1,366.4  1,430.4
std. dev.  368.6  359.7  405.0
Low Yield  Disaster  Prog.
High target prices
mean  1,406.8
std.  dev.  477.8
Low target prices
mean  1,394.0
std. dev.  455.2
No  Crop  Insurance  and
No  Disaster  Program
mean  1,326.9
std. dev.  370.7
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TABLE  4.  Continued.
FCI  Price Election  Levels
No  Federal
Type  of Coverage  Low Price  Medium  Price  High  Price  Crop  Insurance
Federal  Crop  Insurance
Low  yield (50%)
mean
std. dev.
Medium  yield (65%)
mean
std. dev.
High yield  (75%)
mean
std.  dev.







No Crop  Insurance  and
No  Disaster  Program
mean
std. dev.
Federal  Crop  Insurance
Low  yield (50%)
mean
std. dev.
Medium yield  (65%)
mean
std. dev.
High yield  (75%)
mean
std.  dev.







No Crop  Insurance  and
No  Disaster  Program
mean
std. dev.
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TABLE  4.  Continued.
FCI  Price  Election  Levels  No  F No  Federal
Type of Coverage  Low  Price  Medium Price  High  Price  Crop  Insurance
-------------Ending  Loss  Ratio Indemnities  to  Premiums  (fraction)---------------
Federal  Crop  Insurance
Low yield  (50%)
mean  1.64  1.64  1.64
std.  dev.  0.73  0.73  0.73
Medium yield  (65%)
mean  1.61  1.61  1.61
std. dev.  0.59  0.59  0.59
High yield  (75%)
mean  1.41  1.41  1.41
std. dev.  0.46  0.46  0.46
TABLE 5.  Comparison  of Alternative  Crop  Protection  Options for Four  Classes of Decision
Makers.
1
Risk Preference  Class
2
Preference  Risk  Risk  Moderately  Risk
Sets  Loving  Neutral  Risk Averse  Averse
Most  C9  C2  C6  C9






Second  C6  C1  C7  C6
C8  C5  B2
B2  B2
Third  C3  C4  C5  C8
C5  A
C7
Fourth  C2  --  C2  C7
C4  C3
C4
Fifth  C1  --  C1  C5
A
Sixth  --  --  A  C4
Seventh  ---  --  B1
Eighth  --  --  C3
B2
Ninth  --  --  --  C2
Tenth  --  --  C1
Eleventh  --  --  --  A
'The  crop protection options  composed  here are described  in Table  3.
2The  risk  coefficient  boundaries  are,  respectively,  (-0.0001,  0.0),  (-
0.000015).
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nance with respect to a function.  The options
in the most preferred  set are those options to
which the producer was indifferent,  or which
were  preferred  over  all  other  options.  The
second  most preferred  set contains those op-
tions  which the producer  preferred  or  is in-
different  to,  if the  options  in the  most  pre-
ferred  set  are  not  available.  The  additional
preferred  sets  in  Table  5  are  similarly  de-
fined.
The  most preferred  set  for  the  more  risk
averse  producer  contains  only  the  highest
level  of crop  insurance  (C9).  The  most pre-
ferred  set  for  the  less  risk  averse  producer
includes  several  additional  levels  of crop in-
surance  coverage  (C6,  C8,  and C9) plus  the
disaster program assuming high target prices
(B1).  For  both  classes  of  risk  aversion,  a
decision  maker prefers  any  level of crop  in-
surance  or  ASCS  disaster  protection  over
non-participation  (A),  since non-participation
is the least preferred  set for both risk averse
classes.  Whether  cotton target prices  are  in-
creased at the lower rate (4 percent per year
after 1985)  or the higher rate (7 percent),  the
more  risk  averse  cotton  producers  on  the
High Plains should prefer participation in the
FCI program  to the ASCS disaster program.
Young's  work provides evidence  that farm-
ers'  preferences  exhibit  decreaing  absolute
risk  aversion,  meaning  as  a  farmer's  net
worth  increased he would  be more  likely  to
make  risky  choices.  Robison proposes  that a
farm whose survival is at stake may also make
decisions  which appear  to indicate  a prefer-
ence  for risk,  simply because  the alternative
to accepting greater risk is certain  collapse of
the  farm.  In  light of the current  increase  in
farm  bankruptcies  it is  interesting  to  look at
the  preferences  of  a  risk  loving  producer.
Even with a preference  for risk,  High Plains
cotton  producers  should  elect  some  kind  of
disaster  protection,  the  most  preferred  op-
tions  being  the  highest  level  of crop  insur-
ance  (C9) and the  disaster program  (B1).
When risk  is not considered  in an analysis
of program  options,  risk  neutrality  is  as-
sumed.  Producers  in the risk neutral  classifi-
cation  should be indifferent  between all high
levels  of FCIC coverage  (C7,  C8,  and C9);
medium yield  high price  coverage  (C6);  and
high price coverage (C2 and C3); and disaster
assistance  with high target prices  (B1).4
Conclusions
A  whole-farm  simulation  model  was  used
to  analyze  the  benefits  to  a  typical  Texas
High  Plains cotton farm  from participating  in
either  Federal  Crop  Insurance,  the  ASCS
low  yield  disaster  program,  or  no  crop pro-
tection  programs.  The  farm  was  simulated
recursively  over  a  10-year planning  horizon
using stochastic prices  and yields to develop
probability  distributions  for  selected  output
variables.  The  probability  distributions  for
after-tax  net  present  value,  generated  for
each of the eleven disaster coverage  options,
were  evaluated  using  stochastic  dominance
with respect  to a function.
The  results  of  the  stochastic  dominance
analysis for four different risk classes indicate
that various levels of Federal Crop Insurance
coverage  should  be  preferred  to  the  ASCS
low yield  disaster  program by the  more  risk
averse  producers.  The  preferred  set for  the
most  risk  averse  class  of  decision  makers
includes  only  the  high  yield,  high  price
coverage,  under FCI. Moderately  risk averse
producers  should be indifferent between  the
low  yield  disaster  program  and  the  higher
levels  of  FCI  coverage  (medium  yield  and
high price; high yield and medium price; and
high  yield  and  high  price).  Producers  who
exhibit  positive  risk  preferences  should  be
indifferent  between  the  low  yield  disaster
program and the highest level of FCI cover-
age  (high  yield  and  high  price  election).
Across  all  risk  classes,  the  least  preferred
option  is  to  neither  buy  FCI  coverage  nor
participate  in the low yield disaster program.
Since  low  yield  disaster  payments  were
based  on  target  prices,  two  sets  of  target
4An  individual of course  would  select only  one of these
strategies  since  his  or  her  risk  coefficient  boundaries
would  be more  precisely  defined  than the  range  used
for the  risk neutral category  used  in Table  5.
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prices were analyzed.  For the higher set, the
annual rate of increase  in cotton target prices
mandated  in the  1981 Agricultural  and Food
Act  was assumed  to continue  through  1990.
For  the  low  target  price  scenario,  cotton
target  prices  were  assumed  to  increase  4
percent  per  year  after  1985.  Cotton  target
prices  for 1981-1985  were  the  same for both
scenarios  and  were  equal  to  the  1981  an-
nounced  value  and  the  minimum  values  in
the  1981  Act.  Despite  the  small  change  in
target  prices  the  outcome  was  significant  in
terms of producer preference.  Across  all four
classes  of decision  makers,  the higher target
price  scenario  was  preferred  to  the  lower
one.  Despite the lower target price,  the dis-
aster program was still preferred to low levels
of FCI  coverage by producers  in all four risk
classes.
Over the  10-year  planning horizon,  disas-
ter protection  whether  from  ASCS  of FCIC
significantly  affected  the typical  farm's  aver-
age after-tax  net present  value,  ending  farm
size,  and  ending  leverage  ratio.  Both  pro-
grams effectively reduced the riskiness of the
operation,  enabling  the  producer  to expand
at a slightly faster rate than would have been
possible if he had not elected to participate in
either disaster program.
The  results  of this analysis  are  limited to
the typical  High  Plains  cotton farm  used for
the study.  While the principal conclusions  of
this  study  may  be  valid  in  other  cropland
areas,  care  should  be taken  in  applying  the
results to other farming situations.  Since the
analysis is micro in nature,  the taxpayer costs
of the two crop protection programs have not
been addressed.  Further research  of a more
macro  nature  is needed  to address  the  rela-
tive efficiency  of these two programs.
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